Written for advanced undergraduate and master’s level courses, this book
builds from a base of asymmetric information issues to discuss a wide array of topics and
is illustrated with some timely examples.
- Covers diverse issues such as risk aversion, expected utility, and moral
hazard within the pure theory of insurance
- Provides a clear exposition of the necessary mathematics, a feature which
cannot be found in readers on the topic
- Utilizes an undergraduate economics major level of math
- Uses the simplest economic models possible to keep the text intuitive
- Introduces more mathematically complex techniques such as basic
optimization for students wishing to 'go further' in their analysis
S. Hun Seog is Professor of Finance and Insurance at the Graduate School of
Business, Seoul National University. He received his PhD in Risk and Insurance from the Wharton
School. His research areas include the economics of risk and insurance, corporate
finance, and their applications. His academic papers have been published in Journal
of Risk and Insurance, Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Asia-Pacific Journal of
Risk and Insurance, International Economic Review, Marketing Science, and European Journal
of Operational Research.
Table of Contents
0. Introduction.
Part I: Fundamentals of Insurance.
1. Risk and Expected Utility.
2. Risk Aversion and Riskiness.
3. Principles of Insurance: Risk Sharing and Transfer.
Part II: Demand for Insurance and Insurance Contract.
4. Risk Aversion and Insurance.
5. Corporate Insurance and Risk Management.
6. Liability and Insurance.
Part III: Information and Insurance Contract.
7. Basic Adverse Selection Models.
8. Advanced Topics in Adverse Selection.
9. Moral Hazard.
10. Ex Post Moral Hazard and Fraud.
Part IV: Insurance Market.
11. Insurer Organization.
12. Competition in the Insurance Market.
13. Insurance Cycle and Capacity.
Part V: Insurer Management.
14. Insurance Distribution Systems.
15. Insurance Pricing.
352 pages, Hardcover