Capitalism and political power
"Capitalism and Political Power" presents the author’s research spanning
economics, law and politics. Its central idea is that governments need two components to
consolidate their position: legitimation and economic power. Legitimation is conferred by
popular support, and economic power is based on natural, temporary possession of capital.
This concept draws on Nouriel Roubini and Jeffrey Sachs’ seminal research and on George
Tsebelis’ political theory, looking at political systems as structures formed by
separate political agents – “veto players”. Substantial evidence is provided that
the more complex the political system is, the more capital it holds, and that the
government has only a relative impact on redistribution of capital, decreasing ever since
the mid-1980s, as political systems began to move towards simplification and
standardization.
Krzysztof Waśniewski (b. 1968), Doctor of Economics, Assistant
Professor at the Faculty of Management of the Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Cracow University
in Cracow, Poland. His interests, which earlier focused on corporate strategies, now also
include institutional economics and other social disciplines such as law, political
sciences and sociology.
Introduction
Chapter 1. The constitutional state as a functional technology
1.1. The classical, sociological canon set by Emile Durkheim and Max Weber
1.2. Fernand Braudel and the "set of sets" theory
1.3. Jurgen Habermas and discursive politics 22
1.4. The utilitarian view of the state
1.5. Thomas Malthus and the demographic factor
1.6. The theory of social contract: Rousseau and Rawls
1.7. Herbert Hart‘s theory of law
1.8. The division of powers in political systems
1.9. Attempt at the classification of political systems
1.10. Th e economic role of political institutions and Barry Weingast‘s theory
1.11. Recent evolution in political systems and in international relations
1.12. Changes in international law
1.13. Migrations
1.14. International aid as an aspect of international relations
1.15. Investor-state disputes and international law
1.16. A tentative conclusion: political systems seen as technologies with a lifecycle
based on efficiency
Chapter 2. The fiscal function of constitutional states
2.1. The main fiscal trends observable in the sample of 77 countries
2.2. Bank lending, private debt and public debt
2.3. The general issue of public debt
2.4. Types and clusters of political systems in the sample of 77 countries
2.5. Fiscal stances typical for political systems
2.6. Conclusion - the institutional foundations of capital appropriation in political
systems
Chapter 3. Changes in the ways that capitalism works
3.1. Environmental challenges
3.2. Accumulation and depreciation of capital stock in the global economy
3.3. The velocity of money
3.4. The velocity of money and financial markets
3.5. National case studies
3.5.1. United States
3.5.2. Bolivia
3.5.3. New Zealand
3.5.4. Mexico
3.5.5. Israel
Concluding remarks
Bibliography
Index of names
List of Tables
List of Figures
214 pages, Hardcover
